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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
PROPERTY-PRESUMPTION OF INTENT TO CONFER UPON WIFE
RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP ONLY, IN CHOSE IN ACTION TAKEN IN
JOINT NAMES OF SPOUSES WHERE HUSBAND FURNISHES ALL CON-
SIDERATION-NOT APPLICABLE WHERE WIFE TRANSFEROR.-The de-
cedent owned a mortgage which she transferred, through a third
party, to herself and her husband who paid no consideration. The
husband predeceased his wife but, before his death, assigned his in-
terest to the respondent who now claims such interest from the wife's
estate. The Court held that the wife's transfer created a joint
tenancy,1 thereby vesting a present interest in the husband which the
respondent took by assignment as tenant in common. The presump-
tion that a husband intends merely to create a right of survivorship
in his wife, where he transfers personalty to himself and his wife
who pays no consideration, is inapplicable where the wife is the
transferor. Matter of Polizzo, 308 N.Y. 517, 127 N.E.2d 316 (1955).
At common law a married woman's personal property usually
would vest absolutely in her husband whether it was acquired before
marriage or during coverture.2 The basis for this rule was the doc-
trine of unity of husband and wife under which the wife's legal exis-
tence was deemed to merge with that of her husband.3 However,
with respect to her choses in action a wife had a contingent interest-
a right of survivorship which she retained if her husband failed to
exercise his power to reduce them to possession during coverture. 4
Choses in action held in their joint names likewise conferred such an
interest on the wife.5 It was presumed that by taking title in this
form, the husband intended to confer this benefit upon her.6
During the nineteenth century, many states enacted married
woman's acts which gave wives legal capacity to own personal prop-
erty as if they were sole.7 Since their enactment, some jurisdictions
have held that a chose in action taken in the names of husband and
' The habendum clause of the mortgage read, ". . to the successors, legal
representatives the survivor, such survivor's heirs, assigns. . . ." (emphasis
added).
2 Ryder v. Hulse, 24 N.Y. 372, 377 (1862) (dictum) ; see 2 BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 433 (6th ed. 1774); 1 W s.sn, PROPERTY 704 (1947).3 Whiton v. Snyder, 88 N.Y. 299, 303 (1882) (dictum) ; see 2 BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 433 (6th ed. 1774); 2 KENT'S COMMENTARIES 128-29 (5th ed.
1844).
4 For example, recovering on, or assigning a chose in action constitutes
reducing it to possession. Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N.Y. 202, 206 (1854)
(dictum). In reference to his absolute power to do so, see Ryder v. Hulse,
supra note 2 at 377; 2 BLACKSTONE, CO METARIES 433 (6th ed. 1774).
5 Roman Catholic Orphan Asylum v. Strain, 2 Bradf. 34 (N.Y. Surr. Ct.
1851) ; Coates v. Stevens, 1 Y. & C. 66, 160 Eng. Rep. 28 (Ex. 1834); Borst
v. Spelman, 4 N.Y. 284, 288 (1850) (dictum).
6 See Borst v. Spelman, sapra note 5; Roman Catholic Orphan Asylum v.
Strain, supra note 5.
7 See Fruhauf v. Bendheim, 127 N.Y. 587, 28 N.E. 417 (1891); Allen v.
Hamilton, 109 Ala. 634, 19 So. 903 (1896) ; Johnson v. Stillings, 35 Me. 427
(1853).
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wife, where the husband pays the sole consideration, presumptively
confers an equal interest in the wife (as a gift from the husband).8
The common-law presumption that he intended to confer upon her
survivorship only has been considered abrogated by these statutes.9
In New York, however, despite the enactment of a married
woman's act, the common-law presumption has continued to be ap-
plied in such a situation.10 It does not negate the effect of the married
woman's act," but is merely a factual presumption of what it is
deemed would be the probable intent of a husband under such cir-
cumstances. 12 In some cases, where the presumption was applied,
the husband retained exclusive possession of the chose in action sub-
sequent to the transfer and received all moneys paid in respect to it.13
However, exclusive control by the husband does not appear to be
necessary for the presumption to arise.14  It is clear that there are
only three prerequisites to the application of the presumption of sur-
vivorship: (1) the marital status, (2) the taking of the chose in
action in the spouses' joint names, and (3) the furnishing of all the
consideration by the husband.15 From such a transaction, the cases
conclude that the husband probably intended only a right of survivor-
ship to vest in the wife, and, absent evidence to the contrary, the
presumption prevails. 16 The husband may destroy his wife's right to
8 See, e.g., Powell v. Metz, 55 So.2d 915 (Fla. 1952); Radabaugh v.
Radabaugh, 109 Ind. App. 350, 35 N.E2d 114 (1941); Matter of Loesch, 322
Pa. 105, 185 Atl. 191 (1936).
9 See Matter of Garland, 126 Me. 84, 136 AtI. 459 (1927).
10 See Matter of Kane, 246 N.Y. 498, 159 N.E. 410 (1927); Sanford v.
Sanford, 45 N.Y. 723 (1871) ; Matter of Kennedy, 186 App. Div. 188, 173 N.Y.
Supp. 607 (3d Dep't 1919). Contra, Brosnan v. Gaffney, 209 App. Div. 430,
204 N.Y. Supp. 846 (2d Dep't 1924).
13 Belfanc v. Belfanc, 252 App. Div. 453, 456, 300 N.Y. Supp. 319, 323
(3d Dep't 1937) (dictum), aff'd inern., 278 N.Y. 563, 16 N.E.2d 103 (1938);
see West v. McCullough, 123 App. Div. 846, 108 N.Y. Supp. 493 (2d Dep't
1908), aff'd inem., 194 N.Y. 518, 87 N.E. 1130 (1909).
12 Matter of Kane, supra note 10; Matter of Blumenthal, 236 N.Y. 448,
452, 141 N.E. 911, 912 (1923) (dictum) ; Matter of Albrecht, 136 N.Y. 91, 95,
32 N.E. 632, 633 (1892) (dictum).
13 See, e.g., Sanford v. Sanford, supra note 10; Matter of Larmon, 212
App. Div. 273, 208 N.Y. Supp. 491 (3d Dep't 1925); West v. McCullough,
supra note 11.
14 See Matter of Blumenthal, supra note 12 at 452-53, 141 N.E. at 912;
Matter of Kennedy, mupra note 10.
25 See Matter of Kane, 246 N.Y. 498, 159 N.E. 410 (1927); Matter of
Blumenthal, supra note 12 at 452, 141 N.E. at 912; Matter of Albrecht, supra
note 12 at 95, 32 N.E. at 633; Belfanc v. Belfane, supra note 11 at 456, 300 N.Y.
Supp. at 323, aff'd inee., 278 N.Y. 563, 16 N.E.2d 103 (1938).
16 Matter of Blumenthal, supra note 12 at 452, 141 N.E. at 912; Matter of
Albrecht, supra note 12 at 95, 32 N.E. at 633 (dictum); Belfanc v. Belfanc,
252 App. Div. 453, 456, 300 N.Y. Supp. 319, 323 (3d Dep't 1937) (dictum),
aff'd mere., 278 N.Y. 563, 16 N.E.2d 103 (1938).
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the whole interest upon survivorship by disposing of the chose during
his lifetime, even though she has not consented. 17
The Court, in the instant case, regarded the problem presented
as one of first impression. However, a similar issue was presented
in Prygocki v. Prydatko.'8 In that case, the executrix of the hus-
band's estate sought to recover on an instrument in which the defen-
dant acknowledged his indebtedness to the decedent and his wife.
The defendant and the deceased's wife claimed that the consideration
for the instrument moved solely from the wife. The court denied
the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the ground that
"[t] he presumption is that she did this with the intention that upon
her death title thereto, if still in the joint names, should pass to the
survivor." 19 That court rested its conclusion exclusively on the pre-
sumption which had theretofore existed where the husband furnished
the sole consideration. The opinion does not discuss any evidence
purporting to manifest intent to create a survivorship interest.
The Court in the instant case, viewing the presumption in favor
of a surviving husband as merely a vestige of the common law, re-
fused to apply it in behalf of the wife and reached an opposite result
from that in the Prygocki case, stating that the transfer ". . . would
have created a present joint tenancy had they been unmarried . ..
[and in the absence of evidence as to intent] the same kind of tenancy
was created, notwithstanding their marital relationship." 20 The pre-
sumption was considered inapplicable in this situation since husbands
never suffered the same incapacity for holding personalty as did wives.
Nor did the Court consider the habendum clause as requiring a dif-
ferent result. It was felt that though the words, "the survivor, such
survivor's heirs," might possibly indicate an intent to confer survivor-
ship only, ". . . the very same clause makes the assignment run to
'assigns of the party of the second part,' and that language expresses
the transfer of a present interest .... ,, 21
The Court seems to be correct in determining that the common
law provided the original setting for this presumption. How-
ever, this fact was considered forty-seven years ago in West v.
McCullough,22 and it in no way caused the court in that case to hesi-
tate in applying the presumption. Despite its origin, the presumption
of survivorship has been well established and is recognized as effec-
tuating the probable purpose of these transactions. 23 The taking of
17 See Matter of Kane, supra note 15 at 504, 159 N.E. at 412; Sanford v.
Sanford, 45 N.Y. 723 (1871) ; Belfanc v. Belfanc, supra note 16.
18 105 N.Y.S.2d 205 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
19 Id. at 208.
20 Matter of Polizzo, 308 N.Y. 517, 521, 127 N.E.2d 316, 318 (1955).
21 Id. at 522, 127 N.E.2d at 318 (emphasis added).
22 123 App. Div. 846, 108 N.Y. Supp. 493 (2d Dep't 1908), aff'd mene., 194
N.Y. 518, 87 N.E. 1130 (1909).
23 See cases cited notes 10, 11 and 12 supra.
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title in the manner herein discussed has been recognized as a device
whereby a spouse may effect what amounts to a testamentary
disposition. 24
In view of the basis upon which the presumption rests, it is sub-
mitted that the Court should have applied it if there was no evidence
of an intent to create a present one-half interest in the husband. If
the transferees were strangers to each other, there would be no rea-
son to suppose that the intent was to create such right of survivor-
ship. But where they are husband and wife, it is submitted that such
an intent has been justifiably presumed. During their joint lives,
spouses may, and usually do, enjoy mutually the benefits of property
owned by one or the other. For all practical purposes, the funds
realized upon a chose in action owned by one of the spouses would
find their way to the family purse. It seems reasonable, therefore,
to presume that the transfers herein discussed are motivated by con-
cern for the future welfare and security of the surviving spouse. If,
in a given case, it is claimed that a gift of a present interest was in-
tended, it is not unreasonable to require evidence of such an intent
in order to rebut the presumption.
TORTS - BAT-rERY ACTION AGAINST FIvE YEAR OLD Cuna
UPHEL..-The plaintiff brought an action against a five year old for
battery. The defendant moved a chair and seated himself therein.
As the plaintiff was about to sit where the chair had been, defendant
attempted to place the chair under her. He was unable to do so and
the plaintiff sustained injury. On appeal from a judgment for the
defendant, the Supreme Court of Washington remanded, holding that,
if the defendant had knowledge to a substantial certainty that the
plaintiff would attempt to sit down, he would be liable for battery.
Garratt v. Dailey, 146 Wash. Dec. 186, 279 P.2d 1091 (1955).
Generally, infants are liable for their torts.1 However, if the
tort contains some element which is necessarily wanting in an infant,
he will not be liable.2 Because liability is ordinarily imposed without
regard to the moral quality of the act,3 tender years, of itself, is no
24 See Belfanc v. Belfanc, 252 App. Div. 453, 300 N.Y. Supp. 319 (3d Dep't
1937), aff'd inero., 278 N.Y. 563, 16 N.E.2d 103 (1938).
1 See, e.g., Bullock v. Babcock, 3 Wend. 391 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829);
Huchting v. Engel, 17 Wis. 237 (1863) ; see CoOLEY, ToRTs 120 (3d ed. 1906).
2 Stephens v. Stephens, 172 Ky. 780, 189 S.W. 1143, 1145 (1916) (dictum) ;
Swoboda v. Nowak, 213 Mo. App. 452, 255 S.W. 1079, 1082 (1923) (dictum);
see PROSSER, TORTS 1086 (1941).
3 See Ellis v. D'Angelo, 116 Cal. App.2d 310, 253 P.2d 675 (1953).
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